We estimate both the industrial and aggregate measures of the TFP growth for China over the post-reform period 1982-2000, based on a time-series input-output table and detail micro-level household survey data set on labor inputs. We find that a modest growth of aggregate TFP at 2.5% for the period 1982-2000. Except a very high TFP growth about 9% in early 80s, the aggregate TFP was modest at 2.6-3.3% for the period 1984-1994, but only -0.3% in 1994-2000. Therefore, our study suggests TFP's role was declining after the successful economic reform in China. Except the period of 1982-1984, the accumulation of capital inputs was the main contributor to the high GDP growth in China, and even accounted for more than 80% of GDP growth in 1994-2000. Besides, through our decomposition of the aggregate TFP growth, we find the efficiency gain in the reallocation of capital inputs were also deteriorating in the 90s, the efficiency gain in the reallocation of labor was very little. Our industrial TFP results also suggest many individual sectors were also showing negative TFP growth in late 90s.
I. Introduction
It is widely agreed that the Chinese economy has grown rapidly since the reforms that were begun in 1978. However, there is much disagreement about the exact magnitude and characteristics of that growth. Was it predominantly due to accumulation of factors of production, or was it mostly due to productivity growth? What was the role of reallocation of factors across sectors? These questions are difficult to answer given the quality and quantity of data available. The answers to them, however, are important in understanding the effects of past economic policies and hence to devise future policies.
The primary purpose of this paper is to present some estimates of growth and productivity change by sectors based on currently available data. We also introduce more newly developed data here, this includes a time series of input-output tables and data from a survey of the labor force. A second aim is to discuss the various approximations and assumptions that are necessary to construct time series of data at the sectoral level for the whole economy. As with many papers in this literature we shall discuss in detail the data issues relating to proper deflators and sectoral classification. Our goal is to lay the groundwork for a systematic and clear framework for sectoral productivity analysis of China, i.e. to sketch out a comprehensive approach, and to point out the missing elements for further research to produce better estimates of growth and productivity change.
In our paper, we divide our sample periods into four main periods based on the structure break along China's economic reform. (1) 1982-84, growth mainly attributed to the efficiency gain from the agriculture sector reforms after China's economic reform since 1978, when China launched "household registration system" in rural areas. In 1984, all most all the peasants are in the registration systems. However, the reforms of SOE are quite lagged behind the agriculture reform. (2) 1984-1988, growth mainly attributed to the successful industrial sector reforms. The two-tier economic structure came into being with both plan economy and market economy, and any commodity had legally carried two prices with one planned price set by the central government, and a market price which reflects the market condition upon demand and supply and not regulated by the government. In addition, in this stage Chinese government launched "contract responsibility system" and adopted "open door policy", as well as developed additional fourteen coastal cities as "coastal open cities" to attract foreign investment and technology transfer etc. (3) 1988-1994 , Chinese government adopted a new doctrine so called "socialist market economy"; many "development zones" were established. (4) 1994-2000, the role of SOE had been weakened, and private ownerships had been elevated as "important component of the economy". In addition, China is gradually reducing its tariffs to be ready for integration into the world economy. Therefore, based on the structure break and policy changes in the past years, we calculated sectoral TFP for the four sub-periods described above.
Our preferred approach to estimating productivity growth is to use gross output data rather than using only value added. To do this for the whole economy requires us to construct a time series of input-output matrices. This IO approach forces the analysis to be consistent across the whole economy, a revision of the output deflator of one sector changes the output and productivity growth of that sector but this necessarily implies that the inputs into some other sectors or final demand are also changed. For example, the service sectors are poorly measured in all countries and especially so in China. Services are also inputs into the manufacturing sector, our IO approach forces us to explicitly confront this issue. The productivity estimates for manufacturing is thus not as reliable as one might think.
If we scale these IO tables to official GDP and use official investment and labor data we find that total factor productivity growth in some sectors (at the 2-digit level) are negative. The major contributor is the agriculture sector which is large and showed high (2-5%) TFP growth.
While we are going to focus on sectoral estimates we will also discuss the aggregate economy. We use three aggregation approaches in this paper: direct Domarweighted aggregation, aggregate production function, and aggregate production possibility frontier. The first approach was used extensively in the literature, while the latter two approaches are different from most authors. We decompose aggregate TFP growth into sectoral TFP growth and reallocation effects. Our estimate for aggregate TFP growth is in the 1.9-2.5% range for the whole period. For example, using the estimates from the aggregate production function approach, the 1.9% TFP growth is made up of 2.70% sectoral TFP growth, -0.62% reallocation of value added, -0.17% reallocation of capital, and -0.02% reallocation of labor. This paper is organized as follows. We start with an overview of the relative literatures on the TFP estimations for China's economic growth in sector II. Next in sector III we present a methodology framework on both industrial level and aggregate growth accounting. Sector IV discusses the construction of output and input indices for sector. Sector V and VI present the results of industrial level, aggregate TFP and reallocation effects. Section VII concludes.
II. Literature Review
There are a number of productivity studies of China at the aggregate level, or using value added for broad (1-digit) industries. Very few literatures are focusing on the 2-digits industrial level TFP calculation and decompose the sources of economic growth and reallocation effects. For the aggregate level studies, currently there is not much debate on whether the TFP growth plays an important role in the post-reform growth. But debates are more concerning with the magnitude of the TFP, and whether the future trend of TFP growth is increasing or slowing down. Chow (1993) , using official data prior to 1980 that only included the material sectors (i.e. not including the data on service sectors that were estimated later), concluded that there was essentially no technical progress in the 1952-80 period. Chow and Li (2002) follow the similar methodology by estimating the Cobb-Douglas production function, but update the analysis to the more recent year 1998. They find a positive TFP growth of 3.03% in the post-reform period, together with 5.1% growth in capital input and 1.2% growth in labor input, could be used to explain the 9.4% exponential rate of overall GDP growth from 1978 to 1998. They also simulate an increasing trend of TFP till 2010. Borensztein and Ostry (1996) get the similar result. They estimate the TFP growth was negative at about -0.7% average rate during , but the TFP rose to an average 3.8% per year during 1979 . Fan, Zhang and Robinson (1999 share a similar optimistic view of the future economic growth in China. They divide the Chinese economy in four sectors: agriculture, urban industrial, urban services, and rural enterprises for 1978-95 and find out TFP growth contributed 4.2 percentage points to the aggregate annual GDP growth. Hu and Khan (1997) also suggest that the TFP growth is accelerating due to the deepening of economic reforms. They calculate TFP growth rate was 5.8% for the period 1990-1994, and find that TFP growth surpassed the growth in capital stock in the sample period.
However, many other literatures keep skepticism about the optimal TFP growth. Woo (1998) estimates the GDP growth from 1979-1993 using producer price indices, and decomposed it into factor growth, reallocation and TFP growth. He uses value added but dividing the economy into primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In this paper, he did not try to obtain real value added by double deflation but merely revise the deflation of nominal value added using the produce price indices. In addition, for labor input Woo used number of workers, without adjusting for the composition of workers. The result is that for the period 1979-93 he revised the official growth rate from 9.3% per annum to 8.0% which he decomposed to capital accumulation (4.9%), labor force growth (1.4%), reallocation effect (0.6%) and TFP growth (1.1%). He also divides this period into two subperiods, and shows that TFP growth rate ranges from 2.76 to 3.76% per year for the period 1979-84, but only -0.11-1.58% per year for the period 1984-93. Thus he concludes that the TFP growth is not only low but also declining at the post-reform period. Young (2003) shares the similar skeptical view of the TFP growth in the postreform period, and discusses the problems with the official estimates of real GDP and makes estimates using alternative deflators 1 . He uses the Jorgenson et al. (1987) approach of using income earned by specific category as indicator for the labor productivity, and
incorporates the labor quality into the productivity analysis. He estimated that for the non-agricultural sector total factor productivity growth was only 1.4% per year using his deflators compared to 3.0% using official numbers for 1978-98. He, however, also points out that ignoring agriculture makes this a misleading estimate, that sector is large (a quarter of GDP in this period) but with rather poor data on inputs (labor, land and capital). He comments that China's post-reform productivity performance of nonagricultural economy is respectable but not outstanding, and concludes that the efficiency gains lie mainly in the agriculture sector. Ren (1997) is focused primarily on measurements of real GDP rather than productivity measurements, but the data issues raised there are very relevant to our discussions here. Ren re-estimated GDP growth using alternative deflators and suggest that his figure of 6.0% growth rate during 1986:94 is more realistic than the official 9.8%.
In a more recent paper, Ren and Sun (2005) 83% for 1984-1988 and 1988-1994 respectively, and finally a very slow TFP growth at only 0.52% from . Like Young (2003 , Wang and Yao (2001) also take into account the labor quality in TFP calculations. But they use the number of schooling years as indicative of labor quality. Their TFP results range from -0.87 to -0.38
for pre-reform period, and 1.92 to 2.98 for post-reform period, the differences are due to various labor income shares. Therefore, the TFP estimates in both Ren and Sun (2005) ,
and Wang and Yao (2001) are somewhere between the very low estimates of 1.1 -1.4%
of Woo and Young, and very high estimates of 4-5% of Hu and Khan.
There are also a number of other studies use detailed Census, or survey, data rather than economy wide aggregates, these include Zheng (1996, 2000) , Groves, Hong, McMillan and Naughton (1994) , and Woo, Hai, Jin and Fan (1994) . These studies seem to agree that collective owned enterprises showed much higher TFP growth than state owned ones, but gave very different estimates of the actual performance of the state owned enterprises, ranging from positive to negative. 2 While our analysis at the 2-digit level cannot be compared to these more detailed studies we should note that our results do show both positive and negative productivity growth.
III. Methodology Framework
We now summarize our methodology on both industrial and aggregate accounting to account for the various factors that contribute to growth -factor accumulation, changes in composition of factors, reallocation of factors across sectors and productivity change. Each sector of the economy is described by a production function which uses primary factors and intermediate inputs to produce gross output. This output is used for final demand and intermediate demand, and GDP is the aggregate of final demand, and is also the aggregate of sectoral value added. Much of this is described in detail in our 2 Some of these differences are discussed in Woo (1998) , which also surveyed other papers.
accounting of U.S. economic growth in Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005) , and Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) . (See also Stiroh 2000, and Gu and Ho 2000) .
Readers familiar with this may skip directly to the results in Sections V and VI.
Industrial Growth Accounting
The economy is divided into 33 sectors producing 33 different commodities.
Gross output of sector j in period t is assumed to be produced with a Hicks-neutral production function using various types of capital, labor and intermediate commodities.
(1) 
The index of capital input is aggregated from three types of assets, structures, equipment and auto vehicles. The labor input is an aggregate of the number of workers cross classified by sex, age, and educational attainment. The material input index is aggregated over the 33 separate commodities. These intermediate goods are produced by the 33 sectors plus imports. The construction of these input aggregates is described in section IV below.
We assume that (2) is described by a translog form so the index of technology may be derived from:
, and the v 's are the two-period average share of the subscripted input in nominal gross output :
The P's denote the prices, Yjt P is the output price to the producer (ex-factory price less taxes), Kjt P is the rental price of capital, and Ljt P is the price of labor input. The value of capital input is calculated such that the value of total inputs equals to the value of ouput:
We shall use the output price to calculate the productivity indices. Official GDP is evaluated at purchasers' price, or industry price, Ijt P . The difference between the two valuations is the net taxes on production, NT :
The real value added of sector j, jt V , is defined implicitly from (3) above as output less an index of intermediate inputs :
The following identity is implied:
is the share of value added in gross output. The price of value added is then given by the sum of values divided by the quantity index:
Aggregate Growth Accounting
The above describes the accounting for each sector. We now turn to the aggregation over all the sectors to derive national output. Here we present three alternative methodologies used to construct economy-wide estimates of output growth:
aggregate production function, aggregate production possibility frontier, and direct aggregation across industries.
1) Direct Aggregation Across Industries
The first approach to measure the sources of growth for the aggregate Chinese economy is the direct Domar-weighted aggregate across industries, which is developed by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) . Here we assume that the value-added function exists in each industry, without impose additional assumptions on the crossindustry restrictions on equal value-added functions, mobility of inputs across industries and equal prices for the market equilibrium.
The Domar-weighted TFP is defined as follows: (Hulten, 1978) .
2) Aggregate Production Function
A second approach is the aggregate production function approach. Now one must assume that there is perfect substitution among sectors, each specific type of capital and labor receive the same price in all industries, and the existence of identical value-added functions across industries, which implies that identical price of value-added functions exist across all the industries.
,
P is the aggregate price of value-added for the aggregate production function, and , V j P is the sectoral price of value-added in the individual sector. Thus the total real value added (at factor cost) is calculated as the simple sum of sectoral value added:
This aggregate output is written as a Hicks neutral function of the inputs of capital, labor and land (T):
where t K is an index representing the aggregate of the various capital asset types, where each asset type k is the national sum of the asset in all sectors. We use the Divisia method to derive the input aggregate:
L represents the aggregate of various types of labor:
Due to the lack of data on land valuation and rents, in this paper we make no distinction about the types of land, which is captured into the capital input. This means that we might be overestimating the return to capital in the mining and real estate sectors with our assumption of zero land input. This also means that the return to aggregate capital must be interpreted to include return to this ignored land input.
From (12) we get the aggregate real value added, and we assume that (13) may be written in the translog form. The index of aggregate production technology,
PF t
A , may thus be derived from :
The denominator of the value shares is simply nominal GDP at factor cost, i.e. before indirect taxes.
The relation between the aggregate TFP and industrial direct Domar-aggregated TFP is described in Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) .
From eq. (8) 
is the value share of sector j's value added in total GDP at factor cost. Combining eq. (16) with (18) 3) Aggregate Production Possibility Frontier A more favorable aggregation approach with less restrictive assumptions is the aggregate production possibility frontier (Jorgenson, 1966; Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Jorgenson, 2001, Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005) . In the aggregate production function approach, we impose a very stringent assumption that requires all industries face the same value-added functions and same price of value added. Here, we relax the assumption of the existence of an aggregate production function, and assume that valueadded is not perfectly substitute across industries, thus each sector has its own valueadded price and simple sum of the value-added is not appropriate as in (12). Now we define the aggregate value-added as a Divisia index of individual value added in the aggregate production possibility frontier approach:
where V is the aggregate value-added and j V is the industrial value-added, and j w is the average share of industry value-added in aggregate value-added:
In the factor market, we still keep the assumption of capital and labor mobility and market equilibrium, where each type of heterogeneous capital and labor receives the same price, so we can simple aggregate each type of capital and labor and obtain an aggregate index as equation (14) and (15) above.
Now we define TFP growth from the aggregate production possibility frontier in the same manner as equation (16) 
Similarly we also get the decomposition of the aggregate productivity change as follows: 
Note since we relax the assumption that the price of value-added is the same in all industries as in the aggregate production function, thus leads to different growth rates for aggregate value-added. In this approach, since we have captures the reallocation of valueadded in the aggregate TFP, thus the reallocation of value added is zero.
IV. Constructing output and input indices for sectors
We now describe the construction of the sectoral inputs and outputs as defined in (1) and (2) above. This is based on a time series of input-output "Use" or "Activity" tables which consist of the inter-industry section (dimensioned 33 commodities by 33 industries), the value added section, and the final demand section. The IO tables were constructed by Ren Ruoen in the Beihang University based on the raw data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The detail information and estimation procedures are explained in more detail in Ren and Sun (2005) .
Column j of the Use matrix gives us the value of each intermediate input,
, and the value of capital input ( Kj j P K ), and labor input
The net taxes are included in the capital inputs. The column sum gives us the value of gross output as described in (5) and (6) above:
In Table 1 , the values for gross output, capital input, labor input, energy aggregate input, and non-energy material aggregate input, capita stock and employment are given for 2000. The sum of the capital and labor value added columns equals GDP for s2000. commodity i by all the industries plus the purchases of i by final demanders (consumption, investment, government and net exports). The row sum gives us the value of domestic use of i, which is the domestic output of i. Each commodity may be made by a few industries, and each industry may make a few commodities. The structure of commodity output is given by the input-output "Make" matrix, which is dimensioned 33 industries by 33 commodities. The prices of commodities ( , 1,...
derived by aggregating the price of domestic output with the price of imports (or from surveys covering both items). However, since there is little data on import prices, here we assume they behaved in the same way as domestic prices. 3 The price of domestic commodities is derived from the prices of industry output ( Ij P ) using this Make matrix. (25) ln ln
is the total value of intermediate inputs for sector j and Zjt P is the price index for aggregate material input into j. These are the terms that enter into eqs.
(3) and (4) in the calculation of the productivity index for j.
The flow of capital services is derived by aggregating over three asset classesstructures, equipments and auto vehicles. Our method involves distinguishing between the stock of assets and the flow of services derived from them is described in detail in Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005) and Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) . The main sources of investment data used are from "China statistical yearbook on investment in fixed assets" and numerous years' "Chinese Statistical Yearbook". In this section, we shall merely summarize the methods here but will discuss our adaptations to the Chinese case. The detail description is in Ren and Sun (2005) .
The stock of capital of type k in sector j ( kjt S ) is accumulated from the flow of investment using the perpetual inventory method:
where kjt I is the real investment in asset k, and k δ is the geometric depreciation rate. We assume the asset life for structure is 40 years, and 16 years for equipment and 8 years for auto according to studies on estimation of capital stock in other countries. Thus the depreciation rate of equipment is 17%, structure is 8% and auto vehicle is 26% (Ren and Sun, 2005) . The real investment is given by the data on value of investment divided by the price of capital goods:
The total stock of capital for sector j is the aggregate of the three types:
Each of the asset types generate a flow of services in period t proportional to the stock that was in place at the end of t-1 (
of capital income has undergone many frequent changes in the 1990s and here we shall take a highly simplified view of it to express the rental cost (i.e. a simplification of the detailed formulas for the U.S. in Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni 1987) . We express the rental cost of one unit of the capital stock 1 − kjt S used in period t in sector j as: Table 1 in the column marked "Capital Input". The rate of return is calculated such that the sum of the services over all asset types is equal to this sectoral value:
With this we can now give the expression for the quantity of capital services in eqs. (2) and (3) as the aggregate of all assets :
That is, the weight for each asset type is the rental cost which depends on the common rate of return and an asset specific rate of depreciation. This makes our capital input index different from those that use a simple linear sum of asset types.
(c) Labor input.
The labor input used in this study is constructed by combining the value estimates from the above IO matrices and data from varies labor force. The methodology follows the research guidance of International Comparison of Productivity among Pan-Pacific Countries (Asian Countries) (ICPA) project, also very closely to the one in Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) , Ho and Jorgenson (1999) and Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2005) . We divide the work force by sex, age and educational attainment and aggregate them consistently, The data of the number of labor and breakdown of labor employment in the benchmark years are based on Population Sensuses (1982, 1990, 2000) and Sample
Population Surveys (1987 Surveys ( , 2995 . The data on other years are estimated using annual Estimation of the labor compensation matrix are estimated by reconciling two data sets.
One is the three rounds of Chinese Household Income Surveys (CHIP) for 1987, 1995 and 2000, conducted mainly by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and other collaborate institutes. The other one is using the official input-output table we can estimate the average compensation of employment by sectors from the total labor valueadded divided by the total number of workers estimated from the sensuses and populations mentioned above. The detail is described in Ren and Sun (2005) and Yue et al (2005) .
We begin by assuming that effective labor services for each category of labor in sector j is proportional to the hours worked by all workers in that category :
The proportionality constant is represented by q to denote "quality". This is assumed to be constant over time. The total annual number of hours worked is the product of the number of workers, the average hours per week, and the average weeks per year:
The number of workers for year 2000 is given in the last column of Table 1 . As with the capital input in (31), we define the growth of total real labor input as a weighted average of the growth rates of all the categories:
The second equality in (34) is given by (32). The value shares are the compensation shares, where Lljt P is the annual cost of a category l worker. The relative costs of the different types of workers are estimated from compensation surveys as described above.
The actual value of Lljt P is scaled such that the sum over all categories of workers is equal to the total value of labor compensation in j as given by the Input-Output table (eq. 24) (Table 1 , column marked "Labor input"):
This labor input index, jt L , is the one that enters into eqs. (3) and (4) for the sectoral productivity calculation, and Ljt P is the price index of this labor input. In our labor dataset, since we lack of data for 1981, thus our TFP analysis will only focus on 1982-2000.
V. Sectoral Productivity Change
We begin by giving summary statistics of our data to provide some comparisons to other estimates. A snapshot view for one year, 2000, is given in Table 1 . The largest sector by value added or gross output is Agriculture, followed by other private service, construction and electrical machinery. The smallest sector by gross output is gas utilities.
The sector with the largest stock of reproducible capital is the agriculture, other private service, transportation, electric utilities and finance, insurance and real estate, while the sector with the highest employment outside of agriculture is other private service, construction and trade. The sum of capital, labor value-added is GDP, which was 9115.5
bil. yuan in 2000. The growth of sectoral capital and labor input are reported in the next two columns of Table 2-6. Recall that our factor inputs are aggregate indices of the components, as given in eqs. (31) and (34). The growth rates for capital are mostly less than 10%, much lower than the growth rate of gross output. But for some sectors such as oil and gas extraction, finance, insurance, and real estate, the growth rates for capital are very high. This is primary due to the fact that huge investments were installed for stock accumulation during these sample periods in these emerging markets. Or it could be due to the poor guesses of the initial sectoral capital stock or due to poor deflators of investment. The change in labor input is as expected, with a larger growth in labor intensive manufacturing, such as apparel, lumber and wood, leather, communications and etc, or service sectors such as trade, finance, insurance and real estate etc. The third and fourth column show the average growth rate of energy aggregate and material aggregate inputs, we can see that for most of the sectors, the growth rate of material inputs are similar to the growth rate of gross output.
For the sub-period 1994-2000, it is interesting to see that during this period, for some mining and manufacture sectors, the growth rate of labor input is negative, such as in coal mining, metal and nonmetal mining, oil and gas extraction, textile, machinery etc.
This may due to the weak performance of SOEs and induced higher unemployment and laid off workers. However, in the same period the growth rate of capital input flow is still very high, in some sectors even exceeding the growth rate of sectoral gross output, such as oil and gas extraction, construction, lumber and wood, apparel paper and allied, motor vehicles, transportation equipment etc. This suggests that most of the GDP growth maybe driven by the rapid growth of capital input or over-investment in the emerging markets such as real estate, construction etc.
We now turn to changes in total factor productivity as defined in eqn. (3). All five terms in eq. (3), averaged over the sample period and sub-periods, are reported in communications, oil and gas extraction, electric utilities and transportation sectors. For energy inputs, the biggest contributions are in the energy intensive sectors, such as gas utilities, electric utilities, petroleum and coal products, and oil and gas extraction sectors.
For the non-energy intermediate inputs, the smallest contributions are in the agriculture sector and service sectors most notably public service, trade etc.
There are some caveats we should note about. Firstly, enterprises might break up their vertical production process into different companies, thus measurement errors might arise. For example, the nominal gross output may increase but due to the deverticalization, there could be no change in total value added or final demand. We will leave the task of adjusting for this for future work and accept the nominal values as correct.
Secondly, we find that the Oil & gas mining, electric utilities sector and other energy sectors had a large negative estimated TFP growth in our sample periods. As we noted, we do not have estimates of land input for the mining sectors and this may well play a role in producing such an implausible estimate. Another point to note is the large effect of the economic reforms during this period on prices of this sector. We should note that before the sector deregulation, the input prices are highly subsidized, so that the price level is lower than the economy-wide price, while we assume all the sectors receive the same price based on the input-output table framework. Thus after the deregulation, the input price for those sectors will go back to the economy-wide level price. Thus we may underestimate the changes in input price. Given the fixed sectoral value term in the I-O In our TFP calculation, we use both price based and quantity based methodologies to calculate sectoral TFP growth rate. Table 12 shows the results using both methodologies, we can see that the results are the same or quite similar for both approaches. This is also a good way to test our results.
VI. Aggregate Productivity Change and Decomposition of GDP Growth
As we have reviewed in the Introduction there are several estimates of Chinese aggregate productivity performance. Based on our industry data, we use three aggregation methodologies to build up aggregate GDP as described in Section II above. The readers should keep in mind that our preferred method for presenting aggregate estimates is the aggregate production possibility frontier method, which we will focus more on it.
Firstly, we report the contribution of each industry to value-added growth and to TFP growth for the whole sample period and all the sub-periods in table 13-17. For value-added, we report the two-period value added share j w , the growth rate ln j V Δ and the contribution to aggregate value-added growth ( ln For the whole period 1982-2000, we can see that of the 2.70% summed growth.
Agriculture is the biggest contributor with the contribution of weighted TFP growth at 0.91%, followed by electronic machinery with 0.52%, trade with 0.47%, and nonelectronic machinery with 0.43%. The dampers are finance, insurance and real estate with -0.78% and oil and gas extraction with -0.30%. For each sub-period, we have similar conclusion expect for the period 1994-2000, the Domar-weighted TFP values in many sectors are much smaller, all the service sectors show negative TFP, and the aggregate Domar-weighted sum is only 0.83%. In the last period, agriculture is still the biggest contributor with 1.59%, followed by primary metal with 0.84%, electrical machinery with 0.60%, and stone, clay and glass with 0.45%. For this period, the biggest dampers are still finance, insurance, and real estate, construction, other private services, and food products.
The second aggregation method is the aggregate production function approach, which we assume an aggregate production function exists, i.e. assuming perfect substitution among sectors, and all the industries face the identical price of value-added inputs. Here we also apply eq. (16) but use our estimate of aggregate real value added based on the production function approach, not the official estimate of real GDP. Our real GDP is given by the sum of the sectoral real value added (eq. 12) and the sectoral value added is given by subtracting the intermediate input index from the output index (eqs.
3,8).
Table 18 reports the growth rate of the GDP based on the production function approach, and the decomposition of GDP growth. The first line is the growth rate of total value added, i.e. the growth rate of GDP, which is 8.3% per annum for 1982-2000. The GDP growth is very high for the period 1982-1984, then quite stable at 7-8% after 1984.
The growth rate of capital input and labor input are given in lines 2 and lines 3. We can see that the growth of capital input is increasing with time, and even exceed 12% after 1994. The growth rate of labor is quite stable at the range about 3-5%. The contributions of capital, labor and TFP growth, i.e. the components of eq. 16, are given in lines 4 through 6. The contributions of the primary factors are the growth rates multiplied by the value shares. For example for the whole period 1982-2000, of the 8.3% GDP growth, capital contributed 4.6%, labor 1.8% and aggregate TFP growth 1.9%. We find that only for the period 1982-1984, the GDP growth is driven by a very high aggregate TFP level at 7.7%, which is mainly due to the success of China's economic reform in early 80s.
After that, the GDP growth is mostly driven by the capital contribution, and the aggregate TFP is comparably higher, about 2.1% during [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] If we divide the whole economy into primary, secondary and tertiary industries, we find that the main sources of GDP growth are from the efficiency improvement in secondary industry, but the aggregate TFP was declining from 3.7% in 1982-1984 to 2.71% in 1984-1988, 1.9% in 1988-1994 We also noticed that the reallocation effects of capital are positive in 80s, but also declining a lot since economic reform in early 80s. After 1988, the contribution of reallocation of capital inputs even became negative. The opposite trend is the reallocation effect of value added, although they are quite negative in the 80s, but the efficiency was gradually improved in the 90s, and contribute positively in the period of 1994-2000.
Overall, the contribution of the reallocation of labor is very small from our calculation for the whole periods. Now let's return to our preferred approach -production possibility frontier approach, which we relax our assumptions on the existence of aggregate production function, and relax all sectors face same price of value-added. Table 19 gives the growth rate in the aggregate output and decomposition using this preferred approach. Compared with table 18, since we use different approach to calculate the quantity of value added, thus the first line is different. Similarly based on equation 22 and 23, the estimated aggregate TFP is different as well. Our estimated GDP growth using the production possibility frontier method is higher than the aggregate production function method, for the whole period 1982-2000 and sub-periods 1982-1984, 1984-1988 and 1988-1994, but lower for 1994-2000 period. We found that the aggregate TFP for the whole period is 2.51%. Similar to the aggregate production function method, the aggregate TFP in 1982-1984 was very high, at about 9%. In the period of 1984-1088, quite different from the aggregate production function method result which suggests only 0.8% growth in TFP;
we find a fairly significant growth at 3.3% using production possibility frontier method.
Using this method, our estimated aggregate TFP in 1988-1994 is slightly higher than the aggregate production function method, and aggregate TFP in 1994-2000 is lower, only about -0.3%. Except the period 1982-1984 when we observed very high TFP growth, in other periods we find that the contribution of capital accumulation is the main factor to the aggregate TFP growth, and the reallocation of labor is almost ignorable. In our calculation, the aggregate production assumes that the price of value added is the same in all industries, while the production possibility frontier does not. In addition we define the reallocation of value-added as the difference in the growth rates of value added from the aggregate production function approach and from the aggregate production possibility frontier approach. Therefore, in table 10 the reallocation of value added is simply zero for the aggregate production possibility frontier approach.
VII. Conclusion
We have laid out a methodology to account for Chinese economic growth, both at the sectoral level and the aggregate level. Based on a time-series input-output table and detail labor input data from the micro-level surveys, we employ a consistent set of national accounts and micro data sets, to estimate the productivity performance for China during the post-reform period.
Our estimation of the aggregate TFP growth for the post-reform period 1982-2000 is about 2.5%, which is a middle number between the current low estimates of 1.1 -1.4% of Woo and Young, and very high estimates of 4-5% of Hu and Khan, similar to the estimates of Ren and Sun (2005) , and Wang and Yao (2001) . By dividing the whole period into four sub-periods 1982-1984, 1984-1988, 1988-1994 and 1994-2000 , we find a pretty high TFP growth at about 9.1% in period 1982-1984, and a moderate stable period for 1984-1988 and 1988-1994 , but a negative TFP growth for 1994-2000, which suggest a declining trend of future TFP growth. Thus our study support the results in Woo(1998), Young(2003) , and Ren and Sun(2005) , but different from Chow and Li(2002) , Borensztein and Ostry(1996) , Fan, Zhang and Robinson(1999) , and Hu and Khan(1997) .
In addition different from the previous Chinese TFP literatures, we also decomposed the aggregate TFP growth into contributions from weighted Domar-weighted sectoral TFP, reallocation of value added, as well as reallocation of capital and labor inputs. Our results suggest that the main contribution comes from the Domar-weighted sectoral TFP, the reallocation of labor is almost ignorable. The efficiency improvement of the reallocation of capital is positive in the 80s, but negative in the 90s. Except the true technology progress and efficiency improvement in the 1982-1994 sub-period, in other periods the GDP growth is mainly driven by the accumulation of capital inputs, and modest growth of aggregate TFP. Especially in the late 90s, more than 80% GDP growth is driven by the capital accumulation, and the aggregate TFP is even negative.
We also examined the aggregate TFP growth for different sample periods in primary, secondary and tertiary industries, we find that the aggregate nation wide TFP is mainly contributed by the secondary industry and primary industry. Tertiary industry contributed about 20-30% in the 80s, but fairly small in early 90s and even quite negative in the late 90s.
Just as many other TFP literatures, the "well-measured" data determined the quality of our estimates. Although we are confidant that our data set has improved significantly compared to the previous studies, such as we based our studies on a timeseries input-output table and derive labor data from the detail surveys, we still need to 26 consider many uncertainties and poor estimates of some sectors, in particular the service sectors in China. Therefore, our results at this stage are suggestive. The agriculture sector showed good productivity gains, as did many manufacturing sectors. However, many other manufacturing industries showed negative productivity growth. The deregulation reform and subsequent price difference in the energy-intensive sectors and other government regulated sectors, the TFP growth is negative which may due to these poor official data. In addition, we believe our estimates may also be afflicted by the deverticalization problem discussed above and devising methods to adjust for it would be an important improvement. 1982-1984 1982-1984 1982-1984 1982-1984 1982-1984 1984-1988 1984-1988 1984-1988 1984-1988 1984-1988 1988-1994 1988-1994 1988-1994 1988-1994 1988-1994 1994-2000 1994-2000 1994-2000 1994-2000 1994-2000 1982-2000 1982-1984 1984-1988 1988-1994 1994- 1982-2000 1982-1984 1984-1988 1988-1994 1994- 
